JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO IMPLY A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION UNDER THE FTCA
The District of Columbia and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have recently held in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.' and Carlson

v. Coca-Cola Co.2 that private parties, be they individuals or consumer
interest groups, cannot maintain actions to vindicate rights asserted under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).3

In Holloway, two

individuals and two consumer groups brought a class action in federal'
district court4 against Bristol-Myers, the manufacturer of Excedrin, a
non-prescription analgesic compound. The plaintiffs' claim was based
primarily5 on FTCA provisions which prohibit unfair or deceptive
trade practices" and false advertising which induces or is likely to induce the purchase of drugs.7 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that

Bristol-Myers had made false statements in claiming that Excedrin is
more than twice as effective an analgesic as aspirin and that this claim
had been substantiated by a study of pain among patients in a hospital.
The district court dismissed the action, holding that the FTCA does

not create a right of action for private parties.8 In affirming the lower
1. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973), affg 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971).
2. 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'g 318 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The
two decisions are independent. Holloway was decided July 26, 1973 (rehearing denied,
Nov. 7), and Carlson was decided only five days later on July 31, 1973. The Carlson
opinion was amended on August 20, presumably by adding Holloway to its citations.
Id. at 280.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
4. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971).
5. In addition, plaintiffs asserted an equitable cause of action for fraud and nuisance and a common law cause of action for deceit. Id. at 19.
6. Section 5 of the FTCA states in part: "(a) (1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared
unlawful." 15U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
7. Section 12 of the FTCA states in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to
disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the
purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly
the purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely
to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics. Id. § 52(a).
Subsection (b) provides that a violation of subsection (a) shall constitute an unfair
or deceptive act or practice in commerce within the meaning of section 5.
Section 14 of the Act further provides that violations of section 12 are misdemeanors punishable by fine or imprisonment. Id. § 54(a).
8. The cause of action under the FTCA was therefore dismissed for failure to
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court's decision, the court of appeals concluded that both the history
and structure of the FTCA indicate that the right to enforce its provisions lies solely in the administrative agency created by that Act, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).9 Carlson, the second of these
cases, was a class action brought against Coca-Cola and Glendenning
Companies, Inc., its advertising agency, alleging that a nationwide promotional game, Big Name Bingo, was deceptively structured so as to
deprive many participants of prizes to which they were entitled under the published rules of the game.10 Plaintiffs' claim that the
scheme therefore constituted a violation of section 5 of the FTCA was
rebuffed by both the district court and a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that since no private right of
action exists under the FTCA, the plaintiffs had failed even to establish the requisite basis for federal jurisdiction." In a vigorous dissent,
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court then found itself without
jurisdiction over the common law causes of action which had also been pleaded by
the plaintiff, see note 5 supra, since the basis under which it had presumably assumed
jurisdiction over the FTCA claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), see note 11 infra, only
grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over civil actions "arising under any Act
of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints
and monopolies," id. (emphasis added), and since the court could find no other jurisdictional basis for the common law claims. 327 F. Supp. at 22. Because, as the court
judicially noticed, the damages from the plaintiff's purchase of six fifty-tablet bottles
of Excedrin did not equal or exceed $10,000, no jurisdiction for her common law claim
could be found under the District of Columbia's counterpart to federal question jurisdiction, § 11-521, D.C. Code (1967), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See 327 F. Supp.
at 22. Nor did the court find the occasion a proper one for the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction over certain of the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 22-23.
9. It did not follow from the dismissal of the Holloway litigation that no other
action has or will be taken against the questionable advertising involved in that case
since the dismissal in no way precludes the FTC from taking action against the defendants. Normal FTC procedure calls for the filing of a complaint, notice to the party
whose conduct is in question, adjudication before the FTC, and the possible issuance
of a cease and desist order. Appeal from a final FTC order may be taken to a circuit
court of appeals. For the details of FTC procedures and its rules of practice, see 16
C.F.R. ch. 1, subch. A (1973).
Nine years before the Holloway action was instituted, the FTC began a comprehensive industry-wide investigation of advertising representations of the efficacy of nonprescription analgesic preparations. FTC Release, 3 TRADE REG. REP. 10,116 (June
27, 1962). The first publication of the FTC's intention to take action in the area
came in a 1972 announcement of its intent to issue a complaint. Bristol-Myers Co.,
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRDE REa. REP. (FTC Complaints and Orders) 1 19,962
(April 19, 1972). In 1973, the FTC finally issued a formal complaint against BristolMyers and others. Id. 1 20,263 (Feb. 23, 1973).
10. The Carlson plaintiffs claimed that, although a "correct" card was defined as
requiring only one correct answer under the rules of the game as established by the
defendants; the defendants had, with respect to one question, refused to certify cards
submitted to them as correct cards unless they contained two correct answers. 318
F. Supp. at 785.
11. The Carlson plaintiffs sought federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337
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however, Judge Solomon argued that even though the Act does not
expressly provide for a private right of action, the court should have
implied such a right "based on the established principle that a party
has a cause of action when damaged by conduct that violates a statute
' 12
enacted for his protection.
As originally enacted in 1914,1 the Federal Trade Commission
Act was directed at "unfair methods of competition in commerce"'14
and was intended, together with the Clayton Act,' passed in the same
year, to strengthen antitrust legislation. 16 The Clayton Act enumerated specific types of prohibited conduct"7 and specified various means
of enforcement, including express authorization of private suits for
damages' 8 and injunctive relief.19 In contrast, the sweeping language
(1970), which gives the district court jurisdiction over any action arising under a federal statute regulating commerce. See note 8 supra. However, the court of appeals
noted that
[tlo acquire federal jurisdiction a plaintiff must assert a colorable right to
a remedy under a particular federal statute. The statutory provision (Section
5 of the FTCA) invoked by the appellants in this case provided them with
no direct -remedy, either explicitly or implicitly. This conclusion is supported
by solid authority of long standing. 483 F.2d at 280.
Thus, the Carlson majority concluded that the absence of a colorable claim under section 5 precluded § 1337 jurisdiction.
In contrast the Holloway court concluded that
although ... we hold that the Act does not ground a private action, appellants' invocation of the Act in support of a claim that is not plainly insubstantial or frivolous on its face suffices as an invocation of § 1337 jurisdiction. 485 F.2d at 988 n.2.
12. 483 F.2d at 283 (dissenting opinion).
13. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 41-58 (1970).
14. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719.
15. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, §§ 1-26, 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1970).
16. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 11, 38 Stat. 717, 724. See FTC v. BeechNut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 351-52 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311
(1965). For the definitive treatment of the origins of the FTCA, see G. HENDERSON,
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
1-48 (1924).
17. As originally enacted, the Clayton Act prohibited (1) price discrimination to
lessen competition, (2) agreements not to use or deal in competitors' goods, (3) corporation purchases of stock in competing corporations, (4) interlocking directorates
among banks, (5) embezzlement by officers of common carriers, and (6) common carriers' dealing with corporations having interested officers. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch.
323, §§ 2-3, 7-10, 38 Stat. 730-34.
18. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provided: "[Any person who shall be injured in
his business or property . . . may sue therefor in any district court. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. § 4, at 731.
19. Section 16 provided: "That any person, firm, corporation, or association shall
be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States hay-
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of the FTCA's prohibition against unfair methods of competition in

commerce was coupled with the creation of the FTC as the appropriate
mechanism for enforcement.20 Indeed, numerous passages in the
original Act emphasize that enforcement was to be solely in the hands

of the Commission.

1

The FTC's authority was severely limited in

22
1931, however, when the Supreme Court in FTC v. Raladam Co.

read the language of the Act narrowly and held that unfair methods
of competition in commerce could be attacked by the FTC only where

substantial competition, present or potential, was involved. After
Raladam, the FTC could not proceed against even the most grossly
unfair methods of doing business absent the element of competition.
Congress overruled Raladam legislatively by the 1938 WheelerLea amendmentsW 3 to the FTCA, and in the process it also included
several key amendments to the Act. These amendments altered sec-

tion 5 to prohibit "[u]nfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce"24 and added sections 12-15, which prohibit "any false advertisement . . . for the
purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices, or cosmet-

ics."25 With the addition of the 1938 amendments, the Act not only

ing jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by violation of the
antitrust laws. . . ." Id. § 16, at 737.
20. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, §§ 1-2, 5-6, 38 Stat 717-22, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-42, 45-46 (1970).
21. The Act's basic grant of authority to the Commission did not itself imply that
the FTC was to be the sole entity vested with that authority: "The commission is
hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations .. .
from using unfair methods of competition. . . ." Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5,
38 Stat. 717, 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1970). However, the Act then
continued by stating that the FTC can instigate proceedings against violations "if it
shall appear to the commission that a proceeding by it . .. would be to the interest
of the public." Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970) (emphasis added). And within the same subsection, Congress limited private participation in enforcement to permissive intervention in FTC
proceedings: "Any person, partnership, or corporation may make application, and upon
good cause shown may be allowed by the commission, to intervene and appear in said
proceeding..

."

Id. (emphasis added).

22. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). Because of the absence of present or potential competition, the Raladam Court held that an FTC cease and desist order which prohibited the
advertising of a preparation, designed for internal use and denominated an "obesity
cure," was beyond FrC jurisdiction.
23. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111.
24. Id. § 5, at 112 (emphasis added to indicate new language).
25. Id. § 12, at 114-15.
These amendments resulted from the complex political maneuvers which accompanied passage of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92
(1970). See Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Its Legislative
History and Irts Substantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 2 (1939).
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protected the businessman who might be threatened or injured by a
dishonest competitor, but also protected the consumer. 26 The amendments did not, however, expressly alter the FTCA's enforcement
mechanism, and there is substantial legislative history which indicates
that Congress intended that enforcement should remain solely in the
hands of the FTC.
The breadth of the Commission's mandate had
thus been extended. Yet although the Act provided for enforcement
of FTC findings and penalties for violations of its orders, 28 it failed
to mention the possibility of a private right of action to enforce its
provisions.29 Consequently, possible support for the proposition that
a private right of action exists under the FTCA must be sought in
applicable case law.
The pertinent judicial authority begins in 1926, before the 1938
26. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972); FTC v.
A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 199 (1946); Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc.
v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1941). Even prior to the Wheeler-Lea amendments, the Court suggested that the Act was intended to protect consumer interests.
See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). On the other hand, at
least one commentator has argued that the 1938 amendments constitute a radical transformation of the intent of the FTCA.
[W]hen Wheeler-Lea amended Section 5 FTC Act to make "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" unlawful, [the nature of the interests protected by the
Act] was radically transformed. First, a wholly new class of citizens-consumers-became legally protected. Second, a more precise species of unlawful
conduct---deceptive acts or practices-was proscribed, a type of unlawful conduct not normally related to antitrust violations. Hence the old reasons for
not making Section 5 privately actionable no longer govern, and private enforceability of the consumer rights created under Wheeler-Lea really deserves
new, separate and independent consideration. Lovett, PrivateActions for Deceptive Trade Practices,23 AD. L. Rnv. 271, 278-79 (1971).
27. In the course of extended floor debate, proponents of the amendments stressed
the wisdom of restricting enforcement powers to the FTC. See, e.g., 83 CONe. REC.
391-425, 3252-56, 3287-93 (1938).
The remarks of Representative Halleck, an
active participant in the congressional debates on the amendments, show that Congress
was well aware that placing provisions for the regulation of food and drug advertising
in the FTCA meant that enforcement would be limited to normal FTC procedures
(outlined briefly in note 9 supra):
I believe there is another reason why the Federal Trade Commission is
the proper authority to have this power. These provisions, as you gather
from the debate, are generally the subject of quasi judicial action and determination, with decisions to be made affecting the rights not only of consumers
but of producers and distributors. The Federal Trade Commission is a quasi
judicial organization. It is independent and goes on and on year after year
pursuing its activities.
To my mind that is a clear reason why this legislation should delegate
the additional authority to the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 401.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 47, 53-54, 56 (1970).
29. Moreover, unlike many other federal regulatory statutes, see, e.g., Securities Act
of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15
U.S.C. § 78an (1970), the FTCA still did not contain any express grant of jurisdiction
to the federal courts for actions brought under it which grant might provide an indication of congressional intent to allow private parties to enforce the substantive provisions of the FTCA. See note 48 infra and accompanying text.
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Wheeler-Lea amendments, with an offhand dismissal of the possibility
of a private right of action in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange:30
"There is an attempt to allege unfair methods of competition, which
may be put aside at once, since relief in such cases under the Trade
Commission Act must be afforded in the first instance by the commission.' 3 1 The cryptic limitation "in the first instance" detracts from
the clarity of the Supreme Court's otherwise explicit statement and
could be interpreted to suggest that there is a private right to enforce
the FTCA after exhausting the possibilities of doing so through the
Commission itself. When faced, however, in FTC v. Klesners2 with
a private dispute between one-time business associates who engaged
in extensive litigation over the use of a trade name, Justice Brandeis
stated flatly: "Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does
not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private
wrongs. 3 3 Klesner illustrates how completely the Court foreclosed
the possibility of resolving a private conflict under the FTCA. Here, the
Commission-not a private party-was instigating judicial action. It
had issued a complaint and sought to enforce its resulting order in the
courts. Whereas the court of appeals had considered and reversed
the agency determination on the merits, the Supreme Court said that
the merits were beside the point. Since the FTC complaint addressed
what the Court found to be a purely private dispute, the Court held
that it had been improvidently issued and that the action should have
been dismissed as soon as the private character of the controversy became apparent.
Although Moore and Klesner clearly show that no private right
of action was found to exist under the original FTCA, they were decided before the enactment of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendments,
30. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). Moore, president of the Odd-Lot Cotton Exchange of
New York, failed in his attempt to attack, primarily under the Sherman Act, a contract between the New York Cotton Exchange and Western Union which called for
distribution of Exchange quotations only to such persons as were approved by the Exchange.
31. Id. at 603.
32. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
33. Id. at 25. Justice Brandeis continued:
The formal complaint is brought in the Commission's name; the prosecution
is wholly that of the Government; and it bears the entire expense of the prosecution. A person who deems himself aggrieved by the use of an unfair
method of competition is not given the right to institute before the Commission a complaint against the alleged wrongdoer. Nor may the Commission
authorize him to do so. He may of course bring the matter to the Commission's attention and request it to file a complaint. But a denial of his request
is final. And if the request is granted and a proceeding is instituted, he does
not become a party to it or have any control over it. Id. at 25-26 (footnotes
omitted).
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which evince some congressional concern for protection of consumers.
This concern suggested to hopeful litigants that a private right of action
might be implicitly available under the amended Act.3 4 But in Atlanta Brick Co. v. O'Neal, 5 the district court refused to imply a private right of action under the FTCA, that the "Act nowhere gives an
additional right of action to persons injured by unfair trade practices.""0
In another 1942 case, National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright
Co.,3 7 a Massachusetts district court found that by enacting the FTCA
Congress indicated that it preferred to have such uniform federal rules
as might be appropriate initially devised and applied not by federal
courts but by a federal adminstrative agency. . ..
[I]t cannot fairly
be said that Congress went further and . . . authorized the federal
courts to develop a rounded federal common law of unfair competition.38
Subsequent decisions have repeatedly held no private right of action
is available under the FTCA to either individual or corporate plaintiffs.3 9
34. See Lovett, supra note 26, at 279: "If any modem, fair minded review is given
to the question of whether a private right of action should be implied now for deceptive trade practices . . . it seems likely that an effective private remedy could be created by court interpretation. . . ." Such arguments date back many years. See, e.g.,
Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv. 987, 994-98 (1949).
35. 44 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. Tex. 1942).
36. Id. at 42.
37. 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942) (trademark infringement action under the
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 595, 33 Stat. 724, repealed, Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540,
§ 46(a), 60 Stat. 444, concerning use of the trademark "White House" on foodstuffs).
38. 47 F. Supp. at 504.
39. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 147 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1945) (action
against combination among Portland cement producers; FTC is "the only tribunal
clothed with the power and charged with the responsibility of protecting the public
against unfair methods of competition," id. at 594); LaSalle St. Press, Inc. v.
McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. In. 1968), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971) (patent infringement case;
claim under FTCA dismissed); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc., 242
F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Il. 1965) (private false advertising and antitrust action against
manufacturer of lamps used in taking motion pictures; FTCA count summarily dismissed); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa.
1953), rev'd on other grounds, 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954) (dress manufacturer used
competitors garment in advertising his own cheaper imitation; FTCA held not, of itself, to confer federal jurisdiction of unfair competition in dress advertising); Samson
Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950) (allegedly false advertising implying defendant's
store was being operated by unions or for their benefit; no private right under FICA
and even if one were found to exist it must involve interstate commerce).
In spite of this line of authority, some judicial uncertainty has persisted. In a
February 20, 1973 decision, a sophisticated court could still write: "It is not clear that
a private action can be brought in Federal District Court under the Federal Trade
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Although courts have thus far been unwilling to imply a private
right of action under the FTCA, there are numerous instances in which
private remedies have been implied as judicially fashioned corollaries
to various federal statutes. As early as 1916, the Supreme Court
found that when a violation of a federal statute had caused personal
injury, "[t]he inference of a private right of action . . . is rendered
Since then, both the Supreme Court 4 ' and lower
"40
irresistible ....
federal courts4 2 have implied private rights of action under various fedCommission Act ....

"

Lawson Fabrics, Inc. v. Akzona, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1146

(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
40. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916) (Safety Appliance Act).
In Rigsby, the court refers to the maxim ubi jus ubi remedium (where there is a right,
there is a remedy). Id. In Carlson, Judge Solomon cites this passage in his dissent
from the majority's refusal to imply a private cause of action under the FTCA. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 283 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Carlson opinion.
The validity of applying this maxim to this problem, however, is doubtful. The question is not one of implying a remedy where there is a -right, but rather whether there
is a private right of action in the first place. See generally Comment, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 1090 (1948); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes,
77 HARV. L. REv. 285 (1963); Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 454 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971)
(Exchange Act § 10(b)); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1949) (Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5) (the statutory guarantee "might well prove an empty
promise unless the private citizen were allowed to seek judicial enforcement . . .

."

393

U.S. at 557); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 16); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a) ); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (Railway Labor
Act). Contra, Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246 (1951) (no private right of action for violation of Federal Power Act).
42. The leading circuit court decision is Judge Learned Hand's opinion holding that
a civil action for damages could be maintained for a violation of § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934. Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
See also Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971) (Investment Company Act
of 1940); Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1970) (National Railway Labor Act); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.
1970) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934; no standing found under Investment Company Act of 1940); Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(c) ); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv.,
417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969) (Wagner-Peyser National Employment System Act of
1933); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 § 404(b) ). Contra, Intracoastal Transp., Inc. v. Decatur
County, 482 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1973) (Bridge Act of 1906); Connecticut Action Now,
Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899); Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc., 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) (Immigration and Nationality Act); McCord v.
Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971) (Federal Aviation Act of
1958); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 424 F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1970)
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eral statutes.43 Possibly the most significant modern case to imply a
private right of action under a federal regulatory statute is J. I. Case
Co. v. Borak,44 in which the Court held that a private individual could
(Interstate Commerce Act § 5); Royal Sere., Inc. v. Maintenance, Inc., 361 F.2d
86 (5th Cir. 1966) (Small Business Act); Blaney v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 357 F.2d 27
(5th Cir. 1966) (Federal Reserve Act); Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United
Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955)
(Motor Carrier Act).
Several district court decisions have implied private rights of action. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670 (D. Neb.
1972) (Natural Gas Act § 717f(b) ); Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971) (Corrupt Practices Act §§ 608-09); Fagot v. Flintkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969) (Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3) );
Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (Federal Aviation Act § 404(b) ). Contra, Acorn Iron & Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 96
F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (Defense Production Act of 1950).
In Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670
(D. Neb. 1972), the court analyzed the field of judicial implication of private rights of
action under federal regulatory and criminal statutes and formulated a five-part test:
Before a specific private remedy, either equitable or legal, may be found in
a congressional Act not expressly granting one, it must appear that (1) the
plaintiff is within a class intended to be protected by the Act, (2) private
enforcement will further the congressional policy of the Act, (3) the duty
breached was created by the Act, rather than by state statutory or common
law, (4) the violation of the duty affected the plaintiff directly, and (5) no
other remedy is available to guard adequately the right asserted. Id. at 679.
The court continued: "Equitable remedies may be inferred more readily than damage
remedies, and no remedy will go further than necessary to achieve protection of the
asserted right." Id.
Compare Farmland's test with REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965),
which provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest
is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
If one accepts the argument that, absent other remedies, the defrauded consumer has
an action in tort under this section, the interesting question then presents itself as to
whether the action "arises under" the FTCA so as to open the doors of the federal
courts to plaintiffs under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). See note 11 supra.
43. Also typical of the Supreme Court's growing willingness to extend the implication of private rights of action is Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), where it found an implied private right of action for damages sustained in connection with violations of constitutional (fourth amendment) rights. Ac.
cord, United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (fifth
amendment); Butler v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 2257 (D. Hawaii, Nov. 8, 1973)
(first amendment). See generally Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAIv. L. Rav. 1532 (1972).
44. 377 U.S. 426 (1964), aff'g 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963). For an early example of judicial willingness to entertain a private action for damages, albeit an unsuc-
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bring an action for damages against a defendant who had violated section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 45 Although section 14(a), which governs proxy disclosure, contains no specific reference to a private right of action, the Court reasoned that the broad
purpose behind the section-the protection of investors-"implies the
availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result."' 46
Finding that this purpose could not be fully effectuated by the Securities Exchange Commission alone and that private enforcement of
proxy rules would be a useful complement to agency regulation, the
Court held that a private right of action was "necessary to make effective the congressional purpose. '47 Unlike the FTCA, the Securities
Exchange Act contains a section which specifically grants federal district courts jurisdiction over "all suits. . . brought to enforce any liability or duty created" under the Act. 48 However, the thrust of the
Court's opinion suggests that a private right of action was implied from
the underlying statutory purpose rather than as a result of statutory
interpretation of this general jurisdictional provision.49
cessful one, under the Securities Exchange Act, see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238,
244-45 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (dismissed
on the issue of causation).
45. Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the
use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14(a),
48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
46. 377 U.S. at 432.
47. Id. at 433. See Comment, Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: The Basis
and the Breadth of the Federal Remedy, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 328, 337-39 (1964).
48. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act provides in part:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and -regulations thereunder, and
of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
49. In his concurring opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), Justice Harlan wrote:
The Borak case is an especially clear example of the exercise of federal
judicial power to accord damages as an appropriate remedy in the absence
of any express statutory authorization of a federal cause of action. There
we "implied"-from what can only be characterized as an "exclusively procedural provision" affording access to a federal forum-a private cause of action
....
We did so in an area where federal regulation has been singularly
comprehensive and elaborate administrative machinery had been provided.
The exercise of judicial power involved in Borak simply cannot be justified
in terms of statutory construction; nor did the Borak court purport to do so.
The notion of "implying" a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak,
can only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice
among traditionally available judicial remedies according to reasons related to
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It was in light of this background that the Holloway 0 and Carlson5l courts refused to imply a private right of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Reviewing the legislative history of the
FTCA,52 the Holloway court determined that "[t]he conclusion is inescapable that Congress intended enforcement of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendments to rest wholly and exclusively with the Federal Trade
Commission, following the pattern laid down in the 1914 Act.""3
Moreover, the court rejected the argument that, notwithstanding the
language of the statute, a private right of action should be judicially
implied in order to provide meaningful enforcement of consumer protection objectives underlying the Act. Rather, the court found "the
administrative means of achieving those objectives are inseparably interwoven into a unified and comprehensive statutory fabric. 5' 4 Permitting private parties to initiate actions in federal courts, the court
observed, would fundamentally alter the balanced enforcement
scheme embodied in the Act in two significant ways. First, "piecemeal lawsuits reflecting disparate concerns" would replace "a coordinated enforcement program" based upon the sound discretion and expert judgment of the agency. 5 Second, the courts would be forced
to interpret and apply the FTCA without the benefit of prior agency
proceedings. 6 In dismissing the appellants' broad attack on the
the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive law. Id. at 40203 n.4 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
See also Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes, supra note 40, at 461-62.
50. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See notes 1, 4-9 supra and accompanying
text.
51. 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973). See notes 2, 10-12 supra and accompanying
text.
52. See note 27 supra.
53. 485 F.2d at 997.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 997-98. The court stressed the advantages of relying on an agency-directed program of discretionary enforcement:
Inherent in the exercise of this discretion is the interplay of numerous factors:
the relative seriousness of the departure from accepted trade practices, its
probable effect on the public welfare, the disruption to settled commercial relationships that enforcement proceedings would entail, whether action is to
be taken against a single party or on an industry-wide basis, the form such
action should take, the most appropriate remedy, the precedential value of the
rule of law sought to be established . . .

Above all there is the need to

weigh each action against the Commission's broad range policy goals and to
determine its place in the overall enforcement program of the FTC. Id. at
997.
Moreover, the court expressed concern that the FTC's ability to act in an advisory
capacity and thus encourage voluntary compliance would be severely endangered by the
threat of unrestricted private actions. Id. at 998.
56. The court noted that
the role of the courts in the enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act is one that comes into play primarily only after the Commission
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claimed ineffectiveness of the FTC, the court noted that, while such
claims were not novel, "Congress, has not [yet] seen fit to alter the

statutory plan established in 1938. '' S

The invocation of J. I. Case

Co. v. Borak5 s by the appellants was answered in two ways. The pres-

ence in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of section 27, 59 the provision giving federal courts jurisidction over violations of that Act, re-

duced the "degree of 'judicial implication' brought to bear in developing a private remedy.' ' 0GMoreover, the court observed that the nature
of the function performed by the SEC was such that there is little

danger that litigation would disrupt the Commission's administrative
processes, whereas the creation of a private right of action under the
FTCA "may disrupt or incommode the FTC's own investigative or
"...
"I Taken together, these consideraprosecutorial activities .
tions convinced the court that the legislative design had been "delib-

erately wrought" to achieve a balance of competing interests, which
should not be disregarded by judicial implication of a private right of
action.

62

The Carlson majority did not labor nearly so long in reaching

its similar conclusion. After noting appellants' assertion of federal jurisdiction of their claim as one "arising under" the FTCA, it pointed
to numerous decisions holding that no private right of action exists

under the FTCA

3

and completed the syllogism by summarily affirm-

ing the district court's dismissal of the action for failure to establish

a requisite basis for federal jurisdiction: "Section 5(a)(1) equips the
Federal Trade Commission with a flexible tool with which to combat
has set its administrative processes in motion. The court's role is not one
of direct enforcement but one related to the administrative process-in part
supervisory and in part collaborative. Id. at 1002 (footnote omitted).
See note 9 supra. This is in accord with Professor Jaffe's thesis that administrative
agencies and the courts form a partnership. See generally L. JAFFE.
57. 485 F.2d at 1001 (footnote omitted).
58. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). For the relevant text of this section, see note 48
supra.
60. 485 F.2d at 1001.
61. Id. at 1002. It will be recalled that normal FTC procedure, unlike that followed by the SEC, calls for the filing of a complaint and adjudication within the
agency before resort is taken to the federal courts. See note 9 supra.
62. The court apparently ignored the contention of Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-03 n.4, that
the implied remedy created in Borak did not depend on section 27, but rather rested
upon the need to provide an effective means of effectuating the purpose behind the
Act. See note 49 supra. See also Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes,
supra note 40, at 461-62.
63. 483 F.2d at 280.
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unfair trade practices. Consumers cannot transmute that tool into a
crowbar for prying open door 1337 to the federal courthouse." 64
In contrast, Judge Solomon's dissent stressed the alleged inability
of the FTC to effect the congressional purpose of consumer protection.
Emphasizing the ineffectiveness of FTC cease and desist orders as
deterrents against consumer fraud and the inadequacy of FTC resources to deal with its workload, 65 Judge Solomon argued that the
intent behind the FTCA can become reality only through the courts'
recognition of a right in private parties to enforce its provisions. Finally, his dissenting opinion referred to "the established principle that
a party has a cause of action when damaged by conduct that violates
a statute enacted for his protection."' 6 His arguments failed to persuade his brethren, however, and in stating that a private right of action does exist under the FTCA, his dissent stands alone among the
07
body of judicial opinion which has considered the subject.
The underlying purpose of the 1938 amendments to the FTCA
which gave the FTC the power to deal with deceptive business practices,
was to "afford a protection to the consumers of the country that they
had not heretofore enjoyed."68 Yet, like Judge Solomon, numerous
critics have asserted that the FTC has been ineffective in its role as
protector of consumer interests,69 thus indicating the need for judicial
64. Id. at 281.
65. Judge Solomon noted that the Borak court had stressed the practical inability
of the SEC to enforce effectively proxy statement regulations in providing a private
remedy. He argued that
[tihe FTC's ability to protect consumers is even more severely circumscribed.
In 1972, the FTC received 9,000 "applications for a complaint" each month.
At that time there were only 27 attorneys in the Commission's Division of
Food and Drug Advertising. With this disparity between need and resources,
only a few consumer complaints could be considered and even fewer complaints issued. In fiscal 1971, the Commission's Division of Food and Drug
Advertising issued only twelve complaints under Section 5 of the Trade Act.
Four of these were contested and eight were settled by consent decrees. Id.
at 282 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 283, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
67. See notes 30-39 supra and accompanying text.
68. 83 CONG. REc. 392 (1938) (remarks of Congressman Lea).
69. The FTC has no power of its own to imprison, fine, assess or award damages
for violations of the Act's prohibitions of unfair or deceptive trade practices. It may
merely issue a cease and desist order, which can be appealed to a federal court of appeals, against the continuation of the particular activity. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
If this order is affirmed by the court, the FTC may seek fines up to $10,000 a day
for any violation of the order. Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(c) (Nov. 16, 1973), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(1).
The ineffectiveness of the cease and desist order to achieve results is shown in the
extended course of dealings between the FTC and the J.B. Williams Co. in regard to
its advertising of the health tonic Geritol. The FTC began its investigation in 1959,
issued its complaint in 1962, and entered a cease and desist order in 1965. The order
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implication of a private remedy for violations of the Act's provisions
prohibiting deceptive or unfair business practices. 70 The immediate
impact upon consumers of the Holloway and Carlson courts' refusal
to imply such a private remedy is apparent. Private parties injured
by unfair or deceptive business practices will be unable to utilize section 5 of the FTCA as a means of redressing their grievances, and
they may therefore be denied the same degree of protection from unlawful practices as that afforded by other federal regulatory laws for
which more effective means of enforcement are available.71
was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in 1967. J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884
(6th Cir. 1967). Williams submitted a compliance report early in 1968. Late that
year, the FTC held a hearing to determine the fact of compliance and found that the
new advertising still violated the order. A second compliance report was requested.
In March, 1969, the FTC found continuing violations of its 1965 order. See REPORT
oF THE ABA CoMMISSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COmmISSION 43-44 (1969).
Not until April 20, 1970, was a civil penalty suit filed. 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 24,451
(Docket No. 8547). The government's motion for summary judgment in this suit was
granted in 1973, fourteen years after the original FTC investigation was begun. Penal-

ties of $456,000 were assessed against Williams. United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
354 F. Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The impact of this penalty can be put in
perspective only in the context of Williams' advertising expenditures of more than
$7,000,000 per year devoted to Geritol liquid and tablets during the period 1969-71.
Id. at 549 n.24. In this context, the $456,000 penalty for disobeying the cease and
desist order was but a relatively minor added advertising expense.
A thoroughgoing study concluded that FTC efforts in the field of consumer protection have been "inadequate" and that "FTC resources may not match the scope of
the problem ....
" REPoRT oF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
CoMMissioN 37 (1969). The ABA Commission is not alone in its criticism of FTC
effectiveness. See, e.g., E. Cox, R. FELLmETH & J. SCHU, THE NADER REPORT ON
Tm CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMnSSION (1969); Auerbach, The Federal
Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,48 MuNI. L. REv. 383, 39093 (1964). See also G. ALEXANDER, HONEsTY AND COMPETITION: FALSE-ADVERTISING
LAw AND POLIcY UNDER FTC ADmINISTRATION (1967); Kirkpatrick, The Federal Trade
Commission as a Consumer ProtectionAgency, 15 ANTrrRUST BULL. 333 (1970).
70. One commentator has even asserted that a court may imply a private remedy
notwithstanding a lack of congressional intent to provide one. See Comment, Private
Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts: The Judicial Approaches of Statutory Interpretationand Implication, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 413, 429-44 (1972).
71. Consumers may bring a common law action for deceit against false or deceptive advertisers, but this alternative has substantial limitations, not the least of which
is overcoming difficulties of proof in meeting the technical requirements for a common
law cause of action. Furthermore, since the possibly more effective means of aggregating claims embodied in the FED. R. Civ. P. 23 class action mechanism would not be
available with respect to a common law claim raised in a state court, the litigation
expense in many such cases may be clearly out of proportion to the monetary stake.
The district court in Holloway took judicial notice of the minimal damages which could
have been suffered by plaintiff Holloway, the only plaintiff who claimed to have purchased defendant's product (six fifty-tablet bottles) as a result of the deceptive advertising. 327 F. Supp. at 22.
The importance of affording the disgruntled individual some avenue of relief was

520

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1974:506

However, the Holloway and Carlson courts correctly recognized
that even if the FTC is indeed infected by such administrative inade-

quacy, it does not necessarily follow that the proper remedy is judicial
implication of a private right of action under the FTCA. It is difficult to dismiss the Holloway majority's concern 2 that such actions
would have the effect of undermining the system of coordinated enforcement emphasizing voluntary compliance which the legislative history of the FTCA clearly demonstrates forms the heart of the Act's
regulatory scheme. 73 Moreover, the allowance of suits by private
pointed out years ago when it was observed that "the claim of the individual to enforce
somewhere in some way what is apprehended psychologically as a 'right' is an important claim . . ."
Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process,
25 IowA L. Rlv. 485, 531 (1940).
These psychological fires can easily be fueled by an emotionally appealing argument, using Borak, to the effect that the affluent are better protected from securities
fraud than are ordinary citizens from consumer fraud. See Lovett, supra note 26, at
277:
A remarkable contrast now exists in the law; whereas those citizens affluent enough to be deceived in their purchase of stocks and bonds enjoy an implied private right of action under federal securities law, the same type of legal
protection is denied the ordinary run of citizens who are the victims of deceptive trade practices in making consumer purchases. It would seem that our
law accords a distinct preference and a superior level of protection to the
"better class" of citizens, i.e., those prosperous enough to purchase corporate
securities.
See the following passage quoted by Judge Solomon:
Crime is crime whether it be at the tip of a gun or the tip of a pen
and the tip of a tongue of a fraudulent sales operator. All reasonable forces
for years have decried consumer fraud. It is long past time we turned orations into actions, lament into law, exhortation into fraud elimination. Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
72. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
73. The Holloway court noted that the agency-directed enforcement scheme was
the product of a legislative balance which took into account not only consumer protection but also interests of the businesses affected, with particular
concern for tempered enforcement, the orderly development of commercial
standards, and freedom from multiplicious litigation. 485 F.2d at 997.
The legislative history of the 1938 amendments supports this view of the FTC's
role in seeking compliance with the mandate of section 5. The following comments
by Congressman Lea, the primary House sponsor of the amendments, clearly reveal
a concern about subjecting businessmen to immediate prosecution for the Commission
of unfair or deceptive trade practices:
The question of penalties is involved. An amendment is about to be proposed here under a claim of making the penalties more severe. The proposal
is that every violation of the advertising section shall be prosecutable in the
courts in the first instance to collect a fine of not exceeding $3,000. Every
violation would be made subject to a civil action to secure $3,000 in the
courts instead of leaving the businessman as he is now left under the Federal
Trade Commission procedure, to go to the Commission, where, if he can convince them of his honesty and purpose to conform to the law, the matter is
closed so far as the future is concerned, unless he continues to commit his
offense.
The effect of making every case a court case would be to clog the courts.
The thousands of cases which are now disposed of without burdening the
courts would clog the courts, create needless litigation and expense, or else
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parties would, as the Holloway majority suggested, fundamentally alter

the relationship between the courts and the, Commission in that it
would shift the court's role from that of reviewing a prior administrative
adjudication of a disputed claim to that of making a de novo determination of the validity of a claim, including the finding of facts as well as the

formulation of conclusions of law. These problems may well account
for the fact that, although various bills have been proposed to amend the

FTCA by creating a private right of action thereunder, none has
yet emerged from committee. 74

Consequently, in responding to the

current dissatisfaction with existing restraints on false advertising, 5
it would seem necessary to seek other means of ensuring that the public is adequately protected from such practices.1 6

Some state con-

sumer legislation expressly provides for private rights of action;77 howthe law would become a joke.
In addition these penalties would in effect largely destroy the usefulness
of the Federal Trade Commission for ironing out difficulties with business
instead of taking them into court. The great majority of businessmen in this
country are honest. Any assumption that business as a whole is organized
crime or graft is simply not true to the facts. The great majority of people
who advertise want to do the right thing, and if the Government points out
to them where they are making a mistake and are in violation of the law,
they are willing to conform to the law. The man with good intentions should
not be penalized before he has had a chance to correct his mistake. 83 CONG.
REc. 392 (1938).
74. See S. 1823, H.R. 1078, 5368, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), as cited in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1001 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For a sample
of the conflicting views which have thwarted congressional action thus far, compare
Eckhardt, FederalLeverage, 6 T rL 14 (April/May 1970) with McLaren, An Essential
Filter,6 TAIAL 18 (April/May 1970).
75. The limitations of the common law remedy for false advertising, an action for
deceit, are discussed in note 71 supra.
76. One imaginative consumer class action has attempted to obtain relief for damages caused by allegedly false advertising by using section 43 (a) of the Lanham TradeMark Act. Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (Justices Douglas and Stewart were of the opinion
that certiorari should have been granted). Colligan concerned allegations of false descriptions and misrepresentations of defendant's interstate ski tour service club. The
court held that the consumers lacked standing to bring the action. The Lanham Act
provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words
or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall
cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who
shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description
or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be
liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely
indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated,
or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by use
of any such false description or representation. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
See 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 807 (1971) (discussion of the Colligan case).
77. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1780 (West 1973); HAWAIi REv. STAT. § 480-13 (Supp.
1972); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. 49-15-8 (Supp.
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ever, such legislation does not seem likely to become universal despite

the current widespread concern for consumer protection.
One step in a more viable approach to ensuring effective protection of rights of the consuming public might be to increase the re-

sources devoted to the policing of false or deceptive advertising by
the FTC. While some observers have concluded that the FTC is woe-

fully incapable of dealing with even its current workload, 78 certainly
in recent years the agency has assumed a more active and vigorous
79
role in this area.
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Supp. 1971); ORE. R V. STAT. § 646.638 (1971);
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-24-31 (1972); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 2461(b) (Supp.
1970); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1972).
North Carolina, for example, at one time limited its right of action for violation
of its monopolies and trusts law to "such person, firm or corporation" whose business
was "broken up, destroyed or injured" thereby (emphasis added). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-16 (1965). In 1969, the legislature drastically altered the impact of this section
by creating a right of action in "any person" so injured. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16
(Supp. 1971). See Comment, Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition i North
Carolina-The1969 Legislation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896 (1970).
Even where state legislation does not create a private right of action in express
terms, a state court may be willing to find an implied private remedy. In Rice v.
Snarlin, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 434, 266 N.E.2d 183 (App. Ct. 1970), the court held
that a private action could be maintained by a model and her mother who invoked
the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 262 (Supp. 1973),
to attack fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a contract to
place the model's name, address, and telephone number in a directory listing. The
court found that the Illinois General Assembly had actually intended to create a private
right of action when it enacted the Consumer Fraud Act. Rice v. Snarlin, Inc., 131 I11.
App. 2d at 442, 266 N.E.2d at 188. For a criticism of the "statutory interpretation approach," see Comment, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts, supra note
70. The author asserts that the Rice court arrived at the right result for the wrong
reasons, whereas the district court in Holloway got the wrong result using the preferable
"doctrine of implication approach." Id. at 422.
78. See notes 65, 69 supra.
79. Evidence of the FTC's intent to devote more attention to advertising practices
can be found in its new advertising claim substantiation program. See 36 Fed. Reg.
12,058, 14,680 (1971). In January, 1974, it announced that it had "streamlined and
tightened its advertising substantiation program." 2 TPADE Rao. REP.
7573.70
(1974).
For examples of FTC action against false advertising and for discussion of the
range of breadth in FTC enforcement orders, see FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965) (broad FTC order against use of simulated sandpaper in shaving cream advertisement upheld); Jacob Seigel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946)
(FTC's total prohibition against use of trade name "Alpacuna" held too broad); Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FrC, 481 F.2d 1171 (lst Cir. 1973) (broad FTC order
against wrongdoer as well as associates upheld); Consumer Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 400
F.2d 930 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1088 (1969) (order regarding interstate sale of encyclopedias held neither too broad nor too generalized); Erickson v.
FTC, 272 F.2d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1959) (broad restrictions on advertising by hair
and scalp specialist upheld). See generally Note, The Pfizer Reasonable Basis TestFast Relief for ConsumersBut a Headache for Advertisers, 1973 DuKE LJ. 563.
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Furthermore, recent developments have significantly clarified and
enhanced the FTC's regulatory authority and indicate that the Commission may become a more effective protector of consumer rights.
In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC,s0 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the Commission's
authority to promulgate trade regulation rules which have the effect
of substantive law. The ability to make rules which can be used in
the FTC's adjudicatory proceedings as prima facie evidence of the required standard for business activity should have the effect of helping
to streamline agency enforcement action.81 In Universal Credit Acceptance Corp.,8 2 the FTC itself asserted a right to order restitution.8 3
Although this development does not amount to an empowering of the
Commission to assess damages, it nonetheless puts a remedy stronger
than the cease and desist order in its hands. Yet another boost to
FTC enforcement power came in November, 1973, with the FTCA
amendments attached as a rider to the Alaska Pipeline Bill. 4 These
80. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Feb. 26,
1974), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972). The significance of the rulemaking
power goes beyond enforcement to other considerations. See, e.g., Professor Davis'
statement that "p]erhaps the most promising way to control prosecutors' discretion is
through administrative rule making." K. DAvIs § 4.08, at 191 (Supp. 1970). See Note,
FTC Substantive Rulemaking Authority, 1974 DuKE L.J. 297, in 1973 Developments.
81. In affirming the power of the FTC to promulgate substantive rules, the National Petroleum Refiners court observed that the Commission
has remained hobbled in its task by the delay inherent in repetitious, lengthy
litigation of cases involving complex factual questions under a broad legal
standard ....
There is little disagreement that the Commission will be able to proceed
more expeditiously, give greater certainty to businesses subject to the Act, and
deploy its internal resources more efficiently with a mixed system of rulemaking and adjudication than with adjudication alone. With the issues in
Section 5 proceedings reduced by the existence of a rule delineating what is
a violation of the statute or what presumptions the Commission proposes to
rely upon, proceedings will be speeded up. 482 F.2d at 690.
82. 32 A. L.2d 454 (FTC 1973) (franchise scheme involving a plan whereby
merchants could honor all types of credit cards held to violate FTCA § 5).
83. The FTC order was not merely prospective in effect. It also directed refund
of all monies paid by franchisees and retail merchant members for franchise fees, down
payments, or travel expenses incurred in connection with franchise applications, as well
as membership fees, dues, and discount fees during the period from Jan. 1, 1967, to
the effective date of the order. Id. at 457. A related class action, independent of
the FTC proceedings, Headley v. Continental Credit Card Corp., was filed in United
States District Court for the Northern District of California. In that case, the stipulated amended judgment gave an award of $3,937,994.67 to certain franchisees and
other members of the class. Id. at 472 n.29. The agreement on this stipulated judgment makes it unlikely that the FTC decision on restitution will be appealed, and the
possibility of a judicial test from this case of the FrC's power to order restitution is,
therefore, remote.
84. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408 (Nov. 16,
1973).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1974:506

amendments are designed to give the FTC "the requisite authority
to insure prompt enforcement of the laws the Commission administers

by granting statutory authority to directly enforce subpoenas issued by
the Commission and to seek preliminary injunctive relief to avoid un-

fair competitive practices."' 5 Considered together, these developments indicate a willingness on the part of the courts, the Commission,
and Congress to strengthen FTC enforcement powers and suggest the

prospect of increased protection for consumer interests.
Even in light of these developments, more potent additions to
the FTC's authority may be required if the FTC is to fulfill effectively

its mission under the Act. Accordingly, the most attractive method
of transforming the FTCA into an effective instrument of consumer
protection may be legislative action designed to increase further the capacity of the FTC to deal effectively with deceptive business practices.
Granting the Commission the power to award damages and to impose

criminal sanctions for violations of the FTCA's consumer protections
provisions would greatly strengthen the agency's hand and serve as
a significant deterrent for would-be violators. Such an approach would
avoid the dangers inherent in creating, either judicially or legislatively,
a private right of action under the FTCA. 5 The Commission would
85. Id. § 408(b). The first of these purposes is carred out primarily by section
409(b) of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, which adds 44 U.S.C. § 3512
(d) governing the obtaining of information for independent regulatory agencies. The
amended provision shifts from the Comptroller General to the independent regulatory
agencies authority to make the final determination as to whether information sought
by the agency is necessary in carrying out its statutory responsibilities and whether
to collect such information.
The second principal purpose is realized through section 408(f) of the Act. Under this subsection, the FTC may now bring suit in the district courts to obtain temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions wherever it
has reasons to believe (1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal
Trade Commission, and (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance
of a complaint by the Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by
the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the order of the
Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of
the public . . . . Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93153, § 408(f) (Nov. 16, 1973).
Finally, the amendments also provide for increased fines for violations of Commission orders. Id. § 408(c). Furthermore, due to the amendments it is no longer
necessary for the FTC to go through the Attorney General in every case to bring a
court action; if the Attorney General fails to act for the Commission within ten days
after its formal notification and consultation with him about court action it desires
to take, the Commission can appear in court in its own name and by its own attorneys.
Id.§ 408(d).
86. The dangers inherent in the creation of such a private right of action under
the FTCA and Congress' failure to act as yet on several bills proposing such an amendment to the Act are discussed in notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
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be able to develop a coordinated enforcement program while maintaining its procedures for voluntary compliance, and the courts would continue to have the benefit of prior agency consideration of issues which
are brought before them. Strengthening the hand of the FTC in this
fashion would 'be likely to provide substantial protection for the American consumer and would likewise provide for 'the orderly development
of enforcement standards under the direction of an agency sensitive
to both the rights of consumers and the problems of industry.

